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INTRODUCTION
The reply brief submitted by Appellees, William and Irene Love5 (hereafter,
"Loves") obscures the facts and law applicable to this case, by relying upon misleading
statements and presuming the answers to issues before the Court. A primary example is
Loves' assertion that "there is no defect in the chain of title [to the easement] in this
case." (Loves' Br. at 16.) As has been amply demonstrated, there are numerous fatal
defects in the chain of title to the easement claimed by the Loves.
Similarly, Loves' effort to blur the legal distinction between Utah's After Acquired
Title statute and the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed obscures the law applicable to
this case. Loves refer to these doctrines in inconsistent terms; e.g., after acquired title
doctrine, after acquired title statute, common law rule of after acquired title, estoppel by
deed, or common law estoppel by deed. (Loves' Br. at 11-12.) While it is true that
estoppel by deed has a number of subcategories,1 the statutory provision and the equitable
doctrine, although related, are separate and distinct. See Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224,
228 (Utah 1983) (recognizing the effect of both the statute and the "related doctrine" of
estoppel by deed).
Notwithstanding these distractions, a review of the facts and law of this case
reveals that the Loves have no easement over the property owned by Appellant, Arnold

1

For example "estoppel to assert after-acquired title" 9 Thompson on Real Property §
82.11, at 390 & n. 602 (David A. Thomas ed, 1994); see also Hays v. King, 784 P.2d 21,
23 (N.M. 1989) (citing 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §§ 10-54 (1964)), and "estoppel to
deny truth of recitals" 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §§ 31-40 (1996).
1

(hereafter, "Arnold" and "Arnold property") and that the trial court erred in ruling to the
contrary. For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the trial court and
direct that summary judgment be entered in favor of Arnold.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE 1982 WARRANTY DEED DID NOT DESCRIBE THE ARNOLD
PROPERTY.
In this case, the first question to be addressed is whether Utah's After Acquired

Title statute remedied the multiple defects in the 1982 Warranty Deed. Although Loves
assert that the Warranty Deed is not defective (Loves' Br. at 16), the deed was clearly
defective for two distinct reasons. First, the legal description in the Warranty Deed did
not describe any portion of the Arnold property. See Addendum, Exhibit 1, Item 1. In
Item 15 the Arnold property is outlined in yellow. The description of the purported grant
of easement is outlined in green. As can be clearly seen, no part of the purported
easement describes the Arnold property. A deed must describe the "premises55 in
question. U.C.A. §§ 57-1-12, 13 (1994). Because the deed does not describe the
Arnold property it is not effective to create an easement over the same.
With regard to this fatally defective legal description, there is no authority or even
an assertion by the Loves that either the After Acquired Title statute or the doctrine of
estoppel by deed can cure a description as critically defective as that in the Warranty
Deed. Nothing in these theories even addresses such a question.

2

IL

THE 1982 WARRANTY DEED WAS VOID FOR WANT OF A
GRANTOR.
The second reason the 1982 Warranty Deed was defective is because at the time

Western Management executed the Deed, that partnership had no interest in the Arnold
property through which an easement could vest in Lowenberg. This was the case for two
reasons: a) Western management had previously quit claimed any interest in the property
to the Carrera Corporation ("L"); and b) Western Management had no easement
appurtentant to the Arnold property to convey because it had received no such easement
from its grantor Minson-Halander ("B" and "C"), since Minson-Halander had not
received an easement from its grantor Plan-Tech Corp. ("A"). Without clarifying
whether it is the statute or the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed to which they refer,
Loves inaccurately assert that "the after acquired title doctrine" remedies all these
defects. (Loves' Br. at 17.)
III.

THE LOVES RECEIVED NO EASEMENT UNDER UTAH'S AFTER
ACQUIRED TITLE STATUTE, U.C.A. § 57-1-10.
A.

Utah's After Acquired Title Statute Does Not Apply To
Easements.

Although the After Acquired Title statute can cure a defective grant under
appropriate circumstances, the statute does not assist the Loves in this case because the
statute does not apply to easements. The language of the statute limits its operation to
estates. "[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look
beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v. Royal Order
3

of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991). An easement is a servitude, not an estate.
Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946) (M[A]n easement is not a lien, it is rather
a servitude imposed upon the land sometimes said to be 'carved out' of the servient
estate."). Id. Because the clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not
contemplate interests other than estates in land, it does not apply to servitudes such as
easements.
The California decision misconstrued by the Loves in their brief recognizes this
distinction. In Noronha v. Stewart, 199 Cal. App. 3d 485, 488, 245 Cal. Rptr. 94, 95
(1988), a Mr. Jett held a lot under contract but was not the legal owner. Jett testified that
while the lot was under contract he intended to give Stewarts a written easement to build
a wall. The wall was constructed at Stewart's expense upon Jett's property. Id.
Subsequently Jett came into title to the lot and ultimately sold it to Noronha. Noronha
demanded the Stewarts remove the wall. When the Stewarts refused an action was
commenced. Id. The trial court ruled that Stewarts had no easement or license because
at the time Jett gave his permission he was not the legal owner of the lot. Id. at 488-89,
245 Cal. Rptr. at 95. The appellate court reversed, applying only the doctrine of estoppel
by deed. In discussing California's After Acquired Title statute and the doctrine of
estoppel by deed, the court stated:
This statutory rule is limited to grants of fee simple and is therefore not
applicable to the case at hand. The common-law rule, however, survived the
enactment of the statute [citation omitted], and is considerably broader

4

Id. at 489-90, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (emphasis added). The same analysis applies here.
Utah's statute U.C.A.§ 57-1-10 (1994) reads as follows:
If any person shall hereby convey any real estate by conveyance purporting
to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such
conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards
acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately
pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, and such conveyance
shall be as valid as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time
of the conveyance.
This statute is effectively the same as that interpreted by the court in Noronha. There is
good reason for this Court to follow the California court's analysis, particularly in light of
the conflict, which would arise from Loves' interpretation.
B.

Loves1 Policy Argument For Including An Easement Within
U.C.A. § 57-1-10 Would Conflict With Other Statutes.

The policy argument offered by Loves in which they suggest that the After
Acquired Title statute "is broad enough to provide that an easement would pass where the
grantor subsequently obtains fee title" is problematic. (Loves' Br. at 14-15 and n.7.) This
is because ruling that easements are an "estate" within the meaning of the After Acquired
Title statute would create conflicts with other statutes, including U.C.A. §§ 57-1-12, 13
and 14. For example, U.C.A.§ 57-1-12 (1994) is Utah's warranty deed statute. In
pertinent part it states:
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee .. . of the premises therein named,
together with all appurtenances, rights, and privileges thereunto belonging . . . .

5

(emphasis added). An easement is clearly and appurtenance. Black's Law Dictionary
509 (6th ed. 1990). The above-cited statutes recognize the distinction between an estate
and appurtenances to an estate, such as an easement. Loves would include an easement
within the meaning of an "estate" for purposes of U.C.A. § 57-1-10. However, Utah law
is long settled that statutes are to be harmonized, not conflicted. See Wallace v. Estate of
Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 448 (Utah 1998); Division of Unclaimed Property v. McKay Dee
Credit Union, 958 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1998) (quoting Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d
770, 773 (Utah 1991)). Loves suggestion of a "broad" interpretation creates multiple
conflicts and is therefore unacceptable. (Loves' Br. at 14.) The After Acquired Title
statute cannot apply in this case. Thus, if Loves could claim an easement, it could only
arise under the doctrine of estoppel by deed. However, under the facts of this case, that
doctrine does not assist Loves in their claim.
IV.

THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED DOES
NOT ASSIST THE LOVES' IN THEIR CLAIM OF EASEMENT.
Loves cannot demonstrate reasonable reliance on the part of their predecessor.

Despite their argument to the contrary, reasonable reliance is a necessary element of
estoppel by deed in this case. As stated by the Fourth Circuit in Shell Oil Company v.
Trailer & Truck Repair Co. Inc., 828 F.2d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 1987):
In the ordinary case between a grantor and a grantee, detrimental reliance is so
obvious that courts may not bother to mention it, but this is a poor reason for
concluding that detrimental reliance is irrelevant to estoppel by deed. We
acknowledge that there are substantial differences between estoppel by deed and
equitable estoppel, see, e.g., Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986
(1952), but do not see why a party who has not detrimentally relied should be able
to invoke either doctrine.
6

A.

The Court Should Evaluate The Reasonableness Of The Reliance
Of Loves' and Arnold's Predecessors Based Upon An Objective
Standard.

In addressing the issue of reasonable reliance two questions must be answered:
"Whose reliance?" and "By what standard is the reasonableness of that reliance judged?"
In their effort to dismiss reliance as a requirement in estoppel by deed, Loves' invite the
Court to speculate on the subjective intent of the self-dealing owners of these two
properties years ago, when the deeds in question were executed. Such an approach would
be dangerous and unwieldy. The examination of the parties' subjective intent decades
after the deeds were executed would violate the parol evidence rule. Such testimony
would be inherently unreliable and subject to manipulation by the parties for their
immediate purposes. See, ej*., Ronald W. Smith Supplemental Aff., R. at 1001-05.) In
addition, as pointed out by Loves, (Loves' Br. at 15), "the moral qualities of [the]
conduct" of the grantees are not material to estoppel by deed. Equitable Royalty Corp. v.
Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 991 (Okla. 1952). Therefore, the Court should apply an objective
standard based upon the record title at the time of the deeds in question, following
ordinary rules of construction. Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090,
1093 (Utah App. 1998), affd, 994 P.2d 201 (2000) (stating that "[d]eeds are construed
according to ordinary rules of contract construction.").

7

More to the point, the only relevant reliance is that of the respective grantees
under the 1982 Warranty Deed ("D") and the special warranty deed in 1984 ("0"). 2 As
privies, Loves and Arnold are entitled to assert the reasonableness of their respective
predecessors' reliance upon then-existing documents of record. When the facts of record
are examined in an objective light, based upon the clear and unambiguous language in the
deeds, reliance on the part of Arnold's predecessor was reasonable while that of
Lowenberg was not. This is because Western Management had no easement appurtenant
to convey to Lowenberg, because Western Management had not received such an
easement from its grantor ("A", "B" and "C"). Neither did Western Management own
the Arnold property, having previously quit claimed away any interest in that property
("L").
Additionally, the quit claim deed ("N") which forms the basis for Loves' estoppel
by deed claim was not of record when Lowenberg took title, and hence could not have
formed any basis for reliance by Lowenberg. By contrast, no deeds in Arnold's
predecessor's chain of title indicated that the property was "subject to" any easement.
("O", "N", "M", "L", "J" and "I").
B.

Reasonable Reliance Will Not "Eviscerate" The Doctrine of Estoppel
by Deed.

Loves assert that the reasonable reliance element of estoppel by deed would
"eviscerate" the doctrine in Utah. (Loves' Br. at 16.) However, this is not so under the
2

The reliance of the Arnold and Loves is more closely tied to issues of constructive
notice at the time of the acquisition of their respective properties in 1993 and 1995, see
pp. 10-11 and 17-18, below.
8

facts of this case, which involve competing parties relying on two separate chains of title.
Such a case requires the court to examine the equities involved. As the Wyoming
Supreme Court stated:
Not every conveyance involves an estoppel; a sound reason must exist to
result in an estoppel as to after-acquired property. . . . After all the rule of
estoppel is fundamentally one of equity. Thus it was said in Midland
Realty Co. of Minnesota v. Halverson that "the doctrine of estoppel was
invented and engrafted upon the law to prevent wrongs and not to promote
them."
Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyo. Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565, 569 (Wyo. 1946) (citation
omitted). Contrary to Loves' argument, the concept of reasonable reliance is an integral
element of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
For example, the basis of Arnold's counter-estoppel argument is an estoppel by
deed arising from the 1984 special warranty deed ("O"). In that deed Western
Management represented to Arnold's predecessor and privy that no easement existed
across the Arnold property. As a successor-in-interest, Arnold is entitled to assert the
reasonableness of such reliance. The representation in the 1984 special warranty deed
("O") was clearly reasonable because there was no indicalion in the record title to
Arnold's property that it was subject to an easement. On Ihe other hand, as has been
demonstrated above, Lowenberg's reliance on his chain of title could not have been
reasonable. Should the Court so elect, the judgment below could be reversed and
summary judgment entered in favor of Arnold on this basis alone.

9

V,

TO THE EXTENT THAT LOVES' RELIANCE IS MATERIAL, ANY
SUCH RELIANCE WOULD BE SELECTIVE, IGNORING THE
REMAINDER OF THE RECORD TITLE.
Any reliance by the Loves on the deeds of record at the time of their purchase in

1995 goes to the issue of constructive notice pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-3-2, 3 (1994), and
not to a determination of reasonable reliance under estoppel by deed. However, even if
Loves' reliance in 1995 was material, any such reliance was not reasonable. First, as in
Lowenberg's circumstance, when the Loves took title through their warranty deed ("F")
in 1995, the 1982 Warranty Deed ("D") was of record. Loves assert however, that a 1982
quitclaim deed ("N"), which vested title to the Arnold property in Western Management,
later in 1982, was also of record, and that an easement vested in Loves as a consequence.
However, the quitclaim deed ("N") upon which Loves rely, was not in the Loves' chain of
title. This deed is in the Arnold chain of title. Addendum, Exhibit 7. Further, there is no
evidence in the record that this quitclaim deed was abstracted to the tract index for the
Loves' property, that Loves were aware of its existence, or that the Loves relied upon it.
Even if Loves had relied upon the 1982 quitclaim deed ("N"), which they have not
asserted and as to which there is no evidence, Loves cannot rely only upon the quitclaim
deed and disregard the other deeds in Arnold's chain of title.
A party cannot rely on so much of a public record as is favorable to his
contention, and close his eyes to the remainder.
Schmidt v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 90 P. 212, 216 (Wash. 1907); see also Hayes v.
Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1946) (holding that where purchaser had notice of
10

impediments appearing in the chain of title, he is chargeable with knowledge); Burlington
N., Inc. v. L.P. Hall 322 N.W.2d 233, 238 (N.D. 1982) (stating that a person on inquiry
notice who does not make inquiry is deemed to have constructive notice and is not a
purchaser in good faith). Hence, the Loves are also bound by the 1984 special warranty
deed ("O"), through which Western Management represented and warranted to Arnold's
predecessor and privy, that no easement existed across the Arnold property. Therefore,
Loves' selective reliance upon the 1982 Warranty Deed ("D") and the 1982 quitclaim
deed ("N") is not reasonable.
VI.

A R N O L D S CLAIM OF COUNTER ESTOPPEL IS NOT BASED
UPON A QUITCLAIM DEED.
Another Red Herring in Love's Brief is their assertion that there can be no

counter-estoppel based upon a quitclaim deed. (Loves' Br. at 20.) The quitclaim deed
they reference was executed in 1990 and was from H. Fred Smith, Robert S. Halander,
and Ronald W. Smith to Conmart, Inc. ("T"). A fourth individual, Dale N. Minson, gave
a warranty deed to Conmart ("U"), approximately two years later in 1993. Loves1
assertion is well wide of the mark. Arnold asserts a counter estoppel based upon the
1984 special warranty deed ("0"), not the 1990 quitclaim deed ("T").
Moreover, the idea behind Loves' argument is the same as that rejected in Hays v.
King, 784 P.2d 21 (N.M. 1989). In that case, King took through a quitclaim deed. The
quitclaim deed however was recorded after a warranty deed, which formed the basis of
King's claim of estoppel by deed. Id. at 22. In explaining its application to the entire
chain of title rather than only to a quitclaim deed the court stated:
11

It appears that Hays may have misconstrued the [trial] court's use oi the doctrine
[of estoppel by deed] as applying exclusively and directly to the Heymann-King
[quitclaim deed] rather that to the entire Gabaldon-Bosworth chain of title.
Hays v. King, 784 P.2d at 23. The same analysis applies here. Arnold's claim of

warranty deed executed by Western Management, not a 1990 quitclaim deed executed by
three of the four individuals.
CORRECTIVE WARRANTY DEED IS NOT EFFECTIVE
' 1 CORRECT THE DEFECTS IN T OVF<?f CT. ATM OF F.ASFMFNT
H £ 1991

A.

I he Recitals of the Corrective Warranty Deed Demonstrate I hat
The Owners Of Record Title To The Arnold Property Did Not
Execute The Corrective Warranty Deed.

Loves next argue that the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed created the easement in
because the owners of record title tc mi Arnold property executed that deed.

construed as a whole and harmonized to give effect to all of its provisions, both the
individuals and the partnership "collectively" executed the deed. (Loves' Br. at 22.) This
argument fails for I: \ \ c reasoi is
First, the complete language of the relevant recital belies the argument. That
language states as follows:
WHEREAS, Western Management, formerly a general partnership consisting of
H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander; and
Smith, Halander, Smith and Associates, a partnership, consisting ofU. Fred
Smith, Ronald W. Smith and Robert S. Halander (successor in interest to a portion
of the property described in the amended legal description which is presently titled
12

in the name of Smith Halander, Smith and Associates) herein collectively acting of
grantors of their respective interests (emphasis added).
The word "collectively" refers to the two described partnerships, Western Management
and Smith, Halander, Smith and Associates; hence, the parenthetical descriptive clauseformerly a general partnership consisting of H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N.
Minson, and Robert S. Halander". An objective reading of this deed indicates that it was
likely executed as part of the winding up of the affairs of Western Management pursuant
to U.C.A. §48-1-27.
Second, contrary to Loves' position, nowhere in the six lengthy recitals of the deed
does it indicate that the four individuals were the owners of the Arnold property and were
therefore executing the deed in their individual capacities. Had the parties' intended to
sign in that capacity, this could have easily been done and the deed could have so recited.
See In re Granada, 92 B.R. at 504. Instead, the deed and its recitals only refer to facts
and events concerning the Love property, and offers no indication that the deed pertained
to the Arnold property or that the partners were signing individually.
B.

The Signatures And The Certificate Of Acknowledgment Reveal
That The Individuals Did Not Sign The Corrective Warranty
Deed.

If there was any doubt that the partners were signing only on behalf of the
partnership, such doubt is fully and finally resolved by the signatures and the certificate
of acknowledgement on the deed. The signature block on the deed clearly states that it is
executed by " WESTERN MANAGEMENT, A PARTNERSHIP1' and "SMITH
HALANDER SMITH and ASSOCIATES, A PARTNERSHIP". Each signature is as
13

"General Partner." Nowhere in the signature block is there any indication that these
persons were signing in their individual capacity. See Marveon Sign Co. v. Roennebeck,
MA l\2d <>04
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Finally, the certificate of acknowledgment also establishes that the signatures were
given in a representative capacity. The acknowledgement states as follows:
On the 1 lth day of January 1991, personally appeared before me H. Fred Smith,
Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander, who being duly
sworn, did say that they are the general partners of Western Management, a
partnership, and that the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said
partnership and said H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, and
Robert S. Halander, acknowledged to me that said partnership executed the
same. (Emphasis added).
(Emphasis added). From this clear and unambiguous language there can be no question
thai the partnership executed the deed and not the individuals.
I ,

.i^.A. § 48-1-7 Is Not Applicable To This Case Because The
Arnold Property Was Not Partnership Property

Loves' argument based upon I J.C.A. § 48-1-7 is also unpersuasive. (Loves' Br. at
21, 23.) This is because this statute is only applicable to partnership property. The title
nl I 'i (,' A \;4K» I 7 i,- "'.'miwvuiKv ol IVJII piopei'h ol parlnorslnp '"' L i v e s ' aif/umait

rests upon the presumption that the Arnold property was owned by the partnership.
However, Loves concede that the Arnold property belonged to the individuals in 1991
<uul ihtTcluit na Midi piiiliKii >lnp piufk ih
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must be interpreted as binding the interests of the individuals who signed the deed as
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grantors." (Loves' Br. at 22.) Loves further assert that M[t]he individuals signed both as
former general partners of Western Management and for the purpose of 'collectively1
acting as grantors

" (Loves' Br. at 23.) In other words, before this Court Loves

assert that the grantors were acting in both their individual and their representative
capacities as partners. However, before the trial court Loves argued that the property was
partnership property: M[t]he fact that these parties signed the deed[] as general partners of
Western Management rather than as individuals does not affect the validity of the
conveyance." (R. at 601) (emphasis added). Indeed, Loves even submitted the
Supplemental Affidavit of Ronald W. Smith in an effort to prove that the Arnold property
was partnership property. (R. at 1001-05). Even though Loves1 arguments are
ambiguous on this question, they have acknowledged that, consistent with record title, the
Arnold property was individual property, not partnership property in 1991. Hence,
although Loves deride Arnold's partnership and agency analyses, (Arnold's Br. at 23), as
"elaborate and irrelevant," (Loves' Br. at 21), Loves' concessions elucidate a central point
of this case: The owners of the Arnold property did not execute the 1991 Corrective
Warranty Deed.

3

The fact that Salt Lake County listed Lowenberg and Western Management in the
grantor, grantee indices (R. at 642, 644) is evidence that Salt Lake County did not believe
the Corrective Warranty Deed was effective against the Arnold property, which was
owned by the four individuals.
15

^ 'Ill II III!

THE 1991 CORREC I I V E WARRANJ'\ D r i l l IK >FS IN! rill
ESTABLISH LOVES' EASEMENT

1 ovcs (tr^iii' (hroiiiijiuiil llicir brief that the absence of the legal capacity of the
grantor in the 1982 deed is remedied by the 1991 deed. However, under clear authority
of partnership law as well as under settled principles of agency law, the grantor ol tlio

1991 Corrective Warranty Deed did not purport to convey an easement. Thus, the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed was ineffective, lacking both a grantor with legal capacity as
well as the intent to create ai i easei i lent
A.

The 1991 Corrective W a r r a n t y Deed Cannot Confirm The Void
1982 Warranty Deed.

Loves correctly refer the Court to 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 333 (1983) for the
proposition that a correction deed can confirm a prior conveyance i i u \ u

v,. a.
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because the 1982 Warranty Deed was completely ineffective. The Loves also fail to
direct the Court's attention to Section 15 of the above authority, which states:
Thus, the purpose of a correction deed is to admit mutual error and change the
original instrument to conform to the true intent of the parties. On the other handy

a deed which does not of itself purport to convey the land will not operate to
confirm the estate of a grantee who has no estate or whose deed is void.
23 Am Jur. 2d Deeds § 15 (1983). As noted repeatedly herein, the 11>KJ Warranty Deed
was also i » "' I

i< iml ml »i /.laiitui
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lici'ausc the 1982 deed was void.
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B.

The Corrective Warranty Deed Did Not Create A New Easement
In 1991.

A grantor must have both the legal capacity and the intent to convey an interest.
Even if Western Management had the legal capacity to create an easement over the
Arnold property, which it did not, the sixth recital of the Corrective Warranty Deed
makes it abundantly clear that no new easement was intended in 1991.4 That recital
states that the parties intended for the corrections to "relate back" to the 1982 deed and
that the parties did "not hereby create any new limitation periods on actions or extend
the same by virtue of this Deed" ("E"). The creation of an easement in 1991 would have
provided a basis for a new action and hence, a new limitations period. Instead, the
language of the Corrective Warranty Deed, including the legal description in the exhibit,
merely evidences an intent to correct and confirm the void 1982 Warranty Deed, which
the parties incorrectly assumed created a valid easement.
IX.

THIRD PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO RELY UPON THE RECORD
TITLE, THUS ARNOLD TOOK WITHOUT NOTICE OF EITHER
THE 1982 WARRANTY DEED OR THE 1991 CORRECTIVE
WARRANTY DEED.
A.

The 1982 Warranty Deed Was Not Properly Indexed To The
Arnold Property.

The 1982 Warranty Deed was not properly indexed to the Arnold property
because the abstract of the legal description of the purported easement describes no part
4

Loves claim that the parties intent is clear from the deed itself and that "it is difficult to
conceive how the parties could have more clearly expressed their intent..." (Loves Br. at
24.) Of course, in these circumstances the issue of the parties' intent is secondary to the
question of the grantors' capacity.
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of the Arnold property and because no party with an interest in the Arnold property was
indexed to the grantee and grantor indices. These facts are undisputed. Notwithstanding
these undisputed facts, Loves incorrectly assert that the 1982 Warranty Deed was
properly indexed to the Arnold property. (Loves' Br. at 31.) This position is not tenable.
First, as noted by Loves, the indices list the grantor to this deed as Western Management
and the grantee as Lowenberg. (R. at 636, 639.) Neither Western Management nor
Lowenberg held any interest in the Arnold property when that deed was executed.
Next, Loves argue that constructive notice was imparted because the deed was
posted to the east half of the northeast quarter of Section 21. In support of this argument
Loves inaccurately state the "the tract portion of the abstract record is located on the far
right-hand side of the page." (Loves' Br. at 31) (citing (R. at 617.)) However, the
Affidavit of Marlene Peterson upon which they rely, does not so state. Moreover, Loves*
assertion is simply wrong. The tract portion of the abstract record is the abbreviated legal
descriptions which "shall show by tracts or parcels every conveyance or encumbrance ..
. which record shall kept as to show a true chain of title to each tract or

parcel...."

U.C.A. § 17-21-6(6) (1991) (emphasis added). The Peterson Affidavit reflects this fact
where it states: "The quarter section and legal description to which the instrument has
been abstracted are entered at the time the instrument is abstracted." (R. at 617.)
(emphasis added.)
Arnold believes that by statute the tract index is not limited to the "far right-hand
side of the page" as Loves argue, which in this case merely refers an examiner to an 80
18

acre section of land, comprising the east one-half of the northeast quarter of Section 21.
Rather, Arnold asserts that the tract index (the abstracts) must include some abbreviation
(an abstract) of the legal description of the subject property in order to impart notice.
(Arnold's Br. at 40.) It is undisputed that the legal descriptions in the 1982 Warranty
Deed, and in the Salt Lake County abstracts (Addendum, Exhibit 1, Item 1,) do not
describe the Arnold property. Unless a deed is "properly recorded", including an
accurate abstract of the property purportedly affected, there is no constructive notice.
U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 953 (Utah App. 1999); Johnson v.
Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 69 (Utah App. 1999); U.C.A. § 17-21-6(6) (1991); U.C.A. §57-3-2
(1991).
B.

There Was No Notice Of The 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed
Because That Deed Was Not Abstracted To The Arnold Property.

There is no abstract of a legal description of the Arnold property in Salt Lake
County's posting for the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed to the tract index. R. 637,
Addendum, Exhibit 1, Item 3. Loves again assert that notice was imparted simply
because this deed was posted to the east one-half of the northeast quarter of Section 21.
(Loves' Br. at 32.) However, indicating that a deed purports to affect one parcel within
one-eighth of a section (80 acres) does not satisfy the statutory requirement of U.C.A. §
17-21-6(6) (1991). As noted, this statute requires that the abstract record "shall show by
tracts or parcels every conveyance or encumbrance . . . which record shall be kept as to
show a true chain of title to each tract or parcel and the encumbrances thereon . . . . "
Posting a deed to an eighty-acre portion of land, together with all other documents
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affecting all other parcels within that eighty acres, as was done here, does not comply
with the statute.
C.

Unlike Boyer v. Pahvant Merchantile and Inv, Co., There Is
Nothing In The Record Title In This Case To Impart Constructive
Notice.

Loves incorrectly claim that the indices in this case contain more information than
did the indices in Boyer v. Pahvant Merchantile and Inv. Co., 287 P. 188 (Utah 1930). In
so claiming, Loves suggest that including the name of a person who never held an interest
in the Arnold property (Lowenberg) and the name of a partnership that had conveyed its
interest seven years prior to the date of the Corrective Warranty Deed (Western
Management) is sufficient to give notice that the deed purports to affect the Arnold
property. (Loves' Br. at 32-34.) The reverse is true, however.
In Boyer, the trust deed was properly indexed to both the grantors' and grantees'
indices. Similarly, it was properly indexed to both the mortgagors' and mortgagees'
indices. Boyer, 287 P. at 189. Importantly, the names in these indices were the correct
names of the parties involved, including those who owned an interest in the land. The
only omission in Boyer was a legal description (an abstract) of the property in the tract
index. Id. Accordingly, an examination of the grantor, grantee, mortgagor, and
mortgagee indices would have led to the trust deed at issue because it was executed by
the owner of the property, and that person's name appeared in the indices.
In this case however, and in contrast to Boyer, there was no proper listing in the
grantee, grantor, mortgagee, or mortgagor indices. This is because the names listed in the
20

indices were Lowenberg and Western Management, neither whom owned an interest in
the Arnold property in 1991. Furthermore, as in Boyer, there was no abstract of the legal
description of the Arnold property in the tract index. As a consequence, there was less
information of record in this case than there was in Boyer. Indeed, and in contrast to
Boyer, there is nothing in the grantor, grantee, mortgagor, mortgagee, or tract, indices
that shows that the Corrective Warranty Deed purports to affect the Arnold property or
was executed by a party with an interest in the Arnold property.
X.

WESTERN MANAGEMENT DID NOT OWN THE ARNOLD
PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF EITHER THE 1982 OR THE 1991
DEEDS.
At one point in their brief, Loves incorrectly assert that"... Western Management

conveyed the easement to Lowenberg before it divested itself of title to the Arnold
Property . . . ." (Loves Br. at 29.) This statement is simply false. On January 27, 1982,
the date the Warranty Deed ("Dn) was executed, record title to the Arnold property was in
Carrera Corporation, a Utah corporation (f!Llf). Loves have acknowledged that M[a]t the
time Western Management granted the 1982 Warranty Deed, record title to the Arnold
property was not vested in Western Management. [R. 368]". (Loves' Br. at 5.) Similarly,
in 1991 four individuals, H. Fred Smith, Robert S. Halander, Ronald W. Smith and Dale
N. Minson, owned the Arnold property. Western Management had previously conveyed
any interest it had seven years earlier, in 1984 ("0").
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XL

UTAH'S RACE-NOTICE STATUTE HAS NO BEARING ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE 1991 CORRECTIVE WARRANTY DEED.
Loves' effort at page 29 of their brief to engage Utah's Race-Notice Recording

Act, U.C.A. § 57-3-3 (1994) is also wide of the mark. Once again Loves assume a
critical issue before the Court by stating: "The Corrective Warranty Deed was executed
by all the owners of both the Arnold Property and the Love Property...." (Loves' Br. at
29.) The owners of the Arnold property did not sign the Corrective Warranty Deed in
their individual capacities therefore, Loves' race-notice argument fails. This is because
the statute operates where competing valid deeds have been given by a common grantor.
The statute cannot serve to validate a void deed, as in this case. U.C.A. §§ 57-3-2 and 3.
XII. THE QUIET TITLE DECREE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE
EASEMENT.
It is undisputed that the Quiet Title Decree was properly recorded and abstracted
to the Arnold property. This is because the posting for the Decree in the tract index has
an abstract (an abbreviation) of the legal description of the Arnold property. (R. at 617.)
This of course does not answer the question of whether the Decree was effective to create
the easement.
In discussing the Decree the Loves argue matters outside the record. The Loves
assert that the " . . . action [which gave rise to the Decree] was resolved by the parties
executing and recording the Corrective Warranty Deed to limit the easement to the access
ways on the Arnold Property." (Loves' Br. at 26.) There is however, no evidence of this
in the record.
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More to the point however, in interpreting the Decree it is important to note that
there is no indication that Loves' predecessor Lowenberg, sought an adjudication from
the court that an easement existed over the Arnold property. Rather, it was the owners of
the Arnold property} as counter-claimants and third party plaintiffs, who sought an
easement over the Loves9property through their counter-claim as well as a decree as to
side yard setbacks in their third party complaint. The counter-claim was filed seeking
an easement over the Loves9property not seeking an easement over the Arnold
property. In other words, no party sought an easement over the Arnold property. (R. at
708-733.)
In the absence of pleadings which raised an issue as to an easement over the
Arnold property, the district court had no jurisdiction to address that question. A
judgment which exceeds the issues raised in the pleadings, is void. Andrews v. Andrews,
612P.2d511, 514 (Ariz. App. 1980). See also Hendricks v. Interstate Homes, Inc., 745
P.2d 475, 477-78 (Utah App. 1987). Because no pleading raised the issue of an easement
over the Arnold property, the Decree is not effective for the purpose asserted by Loves.
It was the intent of the court, through the Decree, to resolve the issues raised in
the third party complaint concerning violations of side yard requirements. Consistently,
the Decree recites as follows:
IN THIS ACTION, the Court having now made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law respecting the declaratory/quiet title relief sought by
Third Party Plaintiffs for the benefit ofPlaintiff'under Title 78, Chapters 33 and
40 Utah Code Ann., and Plaintiff and Defendants having stipulated to an Order
of Dismissal with Prejudice as to their claims upon entry of this Decree;
23

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that certain
real property owned by Plaintiff William J. Lowenberg with common address of
2215 West 2300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (described in Exhibit "A" hereto),
and the buildings thereon, do not violate any side yard requirements and
otherwise fully comply with the ffRedwood Park Restrictive Covenants"y , , .
There is i 10 e v iciei ice of ai 1 ii itei it to ad ji idicate tl le existence of an easei nei it ovei 1:1 le
Arnold property. The Decree's clear and unambiguous language shows an intent to
adjudicate the issue of side yard violations only, and is not effective to adjudicate an issue
i lot i aised in tl: le pleadings.
XIII.

NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST WHICH
PRECLUDE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF ARNOLD.
Loves attempt to raise three issues of material fact to preclude entry of summary

judgment in fa\ oi of An\

be intent of tl le parties as to the Corrective Warranty

Deed, 2) whether Arnold was on notice inquiry based upon the alleged I lse of tl :te
easement, and 3) whether a prudent title examiner would have located the various
documents of record.
I :;,ii*st, tl lei e is i 10 ambigi iit> ot I tl le 1991 Correcti v e Warrai it\ Deed Its
interpretation is therefore a matter of law. In the absence of an ambiguity extrinsic
evidence as to the parties' intent is not admissible. Capital Assets Fin. Servs. V. Lindsay,
956 P 2<: 1 1090 1093 (1. Jtali

} »j 1998) i iff \ I, 994 1> 2d 201 (2/000); Johnson v. Higley,

989 P.2d 61, 69 (Utah App. 1999). Therefore, there is no material issue of fact arising
from the Corrective Warranty Deed
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Second, no material issue of fact arises from the "open" and "obvious" nature of
the claimed easement. (Loves' Br. at 36.) This is because no easement exists. If Arnold
had inquired of Loves1 predecessor concerning any use of the claimed easement,
Lowenberg would have claimed an easement based upon the 1982 Warranty Deed and
the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. Because these deeds were ineffective to create the
easement, any inquiry notice would have led Arnold to discover that Lowenberg, or the
Loves for that matter, claimed an easement but did not in fact own such an interest. As a
consequence there is no material issue of fact. Any inquiry would have only led to a
claim of an easement, based on these invalid deeds, not an easement in fact.
Finally, Loves assert a factual issue as to whether a prudent title examiner
would have discovered the various documents involved. (Loves' Br. at 37.)
Similarly, no material issue of fact exists here. The same analysis applies to this
issue as applies to the inquiry notice question. That is; even if Arnold's title
examiner had discovered the deeds in question, the deeds would still not be
effective to create an easement. As such, any constructive notice through the
record title would only be notice of a claim of an easement in the same manner as
inquiry notice. Hence, any notice from the record would have only lead to a
claim of an easement, not an easement in fact.
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CONCLUSION
Loves' brief obscures the facts and law applicable to this case. However, and
notwithstanding the distractions, a review of the facts and law shows that the Loves have no
easement over the Arnold property and that the trial court erred in ruling to the contrary. For the
reasons let forth herein, this Court should reverse the trial court and direct that summary
judgment be entered in favor of Arnold Slioi ild the Coi n t so ordei At i lold s claims agaii ist Salt
Lake County would be mooted.
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